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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (Supp.
1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the court below properly interpret the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 & 6 (Rep.Vol. 8B 1995).

The

court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness without deference to the
decision of the court below.

State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638

(Utah App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution, Art. V, § 1.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 12.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 18.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 (Rep.Vol. 8B 1995).
The constitutional provisions not previously included
in the addendum to appellants' brief are set forth in the
addendum to this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court judge properly interpreted the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 to limit the
circumstances under which the Board of Pardons and Parole may
enter an order of restitution as a condition of parole to cases
where an inmate has previously received an order of restitution
as a part of his sentence or where the restitution is to
compensate the State for expenses associated with special
circumstances arising during his incarceration.

By doing so,

the court avoided the constitutional conflicts raised by the
1

State's interpretation of the statutes.

Specifically, Mr.

Stilling asserted below that if the Board had been authorized
by the legislature to order restitution for his underlying
crime when the sentencing judge had refused to do so, such
action would violate both the separation of powers doctrine and
double jeopardy.

Further, because the legislation in question

was enacted after Mr. Stilling had been sentenced for his
crime, he argued that application of the statutes to him would
be prohibited by the constitutional prohibition against ex post

facto

laws.
Judge Lewis' decision avoids these obvious

constitutional conflicts while at the same time giving effect
to the express language of the statutes.

Accordingly, her

decision should be affirmed.
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
STATUTES IN QUESTION SO AS TO AVOID CONFLICT
WITH THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
In evaluating the construction of the statutes by the
trial court, this Court must bear in mind that the petitioner's
challenge below was premised, in part, upon constitutional
grounds.

He argued that any statute which purported to

authorize the Board of Pardons and Parole to impose restitution
orders in the case of an inmate who had not received a
restitution order as a part of his original sentence would
violate both the separation of powers and double jeopardy
provisions of the Utah Constitution.
ambiguous provisions of Utah Code Ann.

In interpreting the
§§ 77-27-5 and 6 (Rep.

Vol. 8B 1995), Judge Lewis followed the axiomatic rule that
courts should construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional
2

conflicts.
1990).

See, Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah

The constitutional conflict raised by the State's

interpretation of the statutes is obvious, as it argues that
the statutes empower the Board to engage in a function which is
judicial in nature and which has already been ruled upon by a
judge.
The Board of Pardons and Parole is a part of the
executive department of government and its powers are set forth
in Art. VII § 12 of the Utah Constitution.

It has the power to

grant parole and "remit fines, forfeitures and restitution
orders" subject to regulations provided by statute.

The

Constitution does not empower the Board to impose fines,
forfeitures or restitution orders.
Restitution is an authorized punishment for criminal
conviction.

See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 (Rep.Vol. 8B 1995).

Restitution imposed in a sentence is penal in nature.
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

The decision to

include or exclude an order of restitution is one to be made by
the sentencing judge pursuant to defined standards.
Any construction of §§ 77-27-5 and 6 which would
authorize the Board to impose orders of restitution on inmates
who did not receive such a sentence from the court would not
only expand the authority of the Board beyond that provided by
the Constitution, it would violate the separation of powers
provision of Art. V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution.

This is

true because it would purport to empower executive department
officials to perform judicial duties.

It is beyond dispute

that sentencing is a core judicial function.
3

As stated in Salt

Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 853 (Utah 1994), "only judges
may enter judgments and impose sentence . . .".

In holding

that the legislature could not grant judicial authority to
court commissioners without violating the separation of powers
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the legislature has
no right to vest judicial authority in non-judges and the
attempt to do so, "is, in and of itself, a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine."

881 P.2d at 852.

If, as the state suggests, the legislature's purpose
in enacting Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 6 was to grant the
Board the power to revisit the prior decision of the sentencing
judge regarding restitution, and to do so using the same
guidelines established for the judge in making the original
sentencing decision, then there can be no question that the
legislature's action was beyond its authority.

Any attempt to

. . . place the exercise of the
judicial power outside the
control of the judiciary
threatens "the fundamental
integrity of the judicial
branch." Thus, if we were to
conclude that [a statute]
represents an attempt by the
legislature or executive branch
to encroach on the judiciary's
constitutionally marketed role,
we would be obligated to strike
it down.
Ohms, supra, at 867 (Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting) (quoting In
re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 [Utah 1988]).
The Supreme Court has previously invalidated
legislative attempts to confer judicial authority upon an
executive department agency.

See, In Re Woodward, 384 P.2d 110

(Utah 1963) (legislature's attempt to place juvenile court
4

under control of public welfare commission violated Art. V, § 1
of the State Constitution).
Furthermore, because an order of restitution is a
part of a criminal defendant's possible sentence, when a
decision is made about restitution by the sentencing judge,
that decision cannot be revisited by anyone, let alone an
executive department agency.

As noted in Smith v. Cook, 803

P.2d 788, 793 (Utah 1990), "[wjhen

a

person has been sentenced

under a statute, that person has incurred a penalty under the
statute".

The double jeopardy clauses of the State and Federal

Constitutions prohibit multiple punishment for the same
offense.

State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1987).

Because an order of restitution is penal in nature, double
jeopardy prohibits the imposition of such a sanction after the
defendant has already received one punishment for his offense.
See, State v. Davis, 903 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1995); United
States v. Haloer, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Given these constitutional infirmities with the
State's suggested construction of §§ 77-27-5 and 6, Judge Lewis
correctly chose to interpret the language of the statutes to
permit orders of restitution to be imposed and enforced by the
Board as a condition of parole only when restitution had been
ordered by the sentencing judge or where restitution is for the
"recovery of any or all costs incurred by the Department of
Corrections or the state or any other agency arising out of the
defendant's needs or conduct".
(Rep. Vol 8B 1995).

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-27-6(3)

By so limiting the scope of the Board's

power under the statutes in question, the court below gave
5

effect to the express terms of the statute while avoiding the
potential constitutional infirmities of the legislation
presented by the State's position regarding the breadth of the
legislation.

Such a construction by the trial court was proper

and it is incumbent upon this Court to give the legislation an
interpretation which avoids constitutional conflicts. As
acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court, "[i]t is the duty of
[an appellate] [c]ourt to construe a statute to avoid
constitutional infirmities whenever possible".
Lindauist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983).

State v

This requirement

includes interpreting statutes in such a way as to avoid having
to resolve potential constitutional questions presented if the
State's interpretation of a statute is adopted.

See, Provo

City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990).
As Judge Lewis' construction is not contrary to the
express terms of the statute in question and avoids the need
for resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petition
below, it should be affirmed by this Court.
As an additional basis for granting petitioner's
writ, the court below held that the statutes in question could
not be applied retroactively to Mr. Stilling because it would
impact on his vested rights and that the attempted application
of the provisions to Mr. Stilling's situation would constitute
a violation of the ex post

facto

prohibitions of the State and

Federal Constitutions.
The statutes in issue were passed after petitioner
had been sentenced in the trial court and no restitution
ordered.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (Rep.Vol. 7A
6

1993), statutes passed by the Utah Legislature are not
retroactive unless expressly so declared.

In Smith v. Cook,

803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that
legislation dealing with the maximum terms of criminal
defendants' probation passed after a particular defendant had
received his sentence, were substantive and could not be
applied to that defendant.

Because the legislation in question

in this case purported to allow the Board to impose an
additional financial penalty on petitioner which was not
authorized at the time of his sentencing, the court below held
that the statute impacted his vested rights and could not,
consistently with Smith, be applied retroactively.
The court further concluded that such an
interpretation was required to avoid a conflict with Art. I,
§ 18 of the Utah Constitution, banning ex post

facto

laws.

Prior to the 1985 amendments to §§ 77-217-5 and 6, the
legislature had not authorized the Board of Pardons to impose
restitution orders.

Even if it is assumed that the legislature

had the constitutional authority to grant such power to the
Board, the legislature's action could only apply prospectively.
In Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790
(Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that
amendments to the statutory scheme governing the procedures of
the Board cannot be applied to inmates who committed their
crimes prior to the enactment of the new statute if the change
is detrimental to the inmate.

The court held that to permit

any subsequently enacted legislation to adversely affect an
inmate's chance for commutation would violate Art. I, § 18 of
7

the Utah Constitution.

Other courts have held that orders of

restitution, not authorized when a defendant's crime was
committed, are punishments within the meaning of the
prohibition against ex post

facto

laws.

For example, in Matter

of Appeal in Maricopa County Juv. Action, 677 P.2d 943
(Ariz.App. 1984), the court held that it was a violation of the
Federal Constitution to seek to impose restitution against
individuals whose offenses occurred before the passage of the
statute authorizing restitution orders and that it would also
be a violation to make compliance with restitution orders a
condition of parole.

Id.

at 946.

As an order of restitution resulting from criminal
conviction is a sentencing option, the established law is that
"the law in force at the time of sentencing govern[s] and . . .
an amendment to [a] statute passed after sentence has no effect
on the matter7'.

Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990).

Accordingly, even if the legislature could authorize the Board
to impose a sentence on an inmate, it could only do so
prospectively and not as to individuals who had already been
sentenced when the new law was passed.
It should be remembered that the reference to the ex
post

facto

laws prohibition in Judge Lewis' decision merely

presents an additional constitutional conflict which is wholly
avoided by affirming her interpretation of the statutes in
issue, which provides an additional reason for doing so.
The State's final argument, that the failure of the
Constitution to expressly grant the Board power to impose
orders of restitution doesn't necessarily preclude them from
8

doing so, does not address an issue ruled upon by the trial
court.

To say that an executive department agency may have

authority to take actions necessary to performing its
constitutionally defined duties even if those actions aren't
expressly articulated in the Constitution itself, is no
response to the argument that an executive agency cannot
perform functions of the judicial branch of government or
impose multiple punishments for crime in violation of express
prohibitions of the Constitution.

If the Constitution gave the

Board the authority to make such orders, then an argument could
be made that it, therefore, was defining such conduct not to be
a judicial function or prohibited by double jeopardy
protections.

Where the Constitution is silent on the authority

of the Board to make orders of restitution, recourse must be
made to the express prohibition of the Constitution on the
agency's action.

It was those prohibitions that Judge Lewis

avoided having to address by construing the statues at issue as
not permitting the Board to impose an additional punishment on
an inmate.
As the issue addressed in the State's final argument
is not a basis for the decision of the court below, it would
serve no purpose for this Court to render an advisory opinion
regarding the authority of the Board to undertake actions not
expressly delegated to it by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Judge Lewis' interpretation of §§ 77-27-5 and 6 is
consistent with the express language of those provisions and
avoids obvious constitutional conflicts with the separation of
9

powers, double jeopardy and ex post
Utah Constitution.

facto

provisions of the

Accordingly, the judgment entered below

should be affirmed.
DATED this 25th day of March, 1996.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. David Eckersl^§^~
Eckerslaar
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
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A D D E N D U M

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section
1. [Three departments of government.]

Section 1. [Three departments of government]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.

An I. ii 18

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto \av>, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be nassed

